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ABSTRACT
This paper describes an approach to predicting the susceptibility of
digital'systems to signal disturbances. Electrical disturbances on a digital
system's input and output lines can be induced by activities and conditions
including static electricity, lightning discharge, Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI) and Electromagnetic Pulsation (EMP). The electrical signal disturbances
employed for the susceptibility study were limited to nondestructive levels,
i.e., the system does not sustain partial or total physical damage and reset
and/or reload will bring the system to an operational status. The front-end
transition from the electrical disturbances to the equivalent digital signals
was accomplished by computer-aided circuit analysis. The SCEPTRE (system for
circuit evaluation of transient radiation effects) Program was used. Gate
models were developed according to manufacturers' performance specifications
and parameters resulting from construction processes characteristic of the.
technology. Digital simulation at the gate and functional level was employed
to determine the impact of the abnormal signals on system performance and to
,
study the propagation characteristics of these signals through the system
architecture. Example results are included for an Intel 8080 processor
configuration.
INTRODUCTION
The use of digital electronic systems onboard aircraft is increasing and
these systems are eventually expected to perform flight-critical functions on
new generation aircraft, thus creating the necessity for ultrareliable digital
systems. Various approaches are being taken to achieve ultrareliable
fault-tolerant systems that will survive the occurrence of component/subsystem
failure. A different threat to digital systems comes from internal state
changes caused by external disturbances such as lightning. Aircraft flying in
adverse weather conditions can be subjected to lightning discharge which will
produce transients on system lines, data buses, etc. Work has been conducted
to establish the interaction between the lightning produced electromagnetic
environment and the aircraft (refs. 1, 2). This work is expected to deter~ine
the induced voltage energy spectrum and levels inside the aircraft as a result
of lightning discharge and the effects of various parameters (electronic system
location, cable length, cable type, shielding, etc.) on the induced voltages.
The inherent characteristics of digital systems make these induced
transients ,a major threat since, unlike analog computational systems, a
transient on a digital system can cause a logic state change preventing the
machine from performing as intended after the transient. In most cases after
the machine has entered into an erroneous operation, a reset and/or reload is
necessary bo bring it to normal operation. This erroneous operation is called
an upset mode and no component or SUbsystem failure exists.
Studies of possible changes in program flow (due to upset) and its
relation to program structure have been underway for several years (ref. 3).
The purpose of the work described in this paper is to develop a methodology
through which the susceptibility of a digital system to induced transients can
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be evaluated. A possible by-product is the identification of system design
procedures that increase or decrease the vulnerability of the system to threats
as described above. Since the susceptibility study deals with nondestructive
transient levels, investigation and tests of component failures caused by
excess voltage levels were performed. Upper bounds were established for
transient voltage levels to avoid failure of the system under test.
The study is divided into two parts: (1) translation of transients into
digital equivalents using component-level circuit analysis by associating logic
levels with the transient disturbance, and (2) functional level digital system
simulation and transient injection using "digital equivalent transients"
produced by the above circuit analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the methodology
described in this paper.
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
The waveshapes used for transient injection are shown in figure 2. These
waveshapes are recommended by SAE subcommittee AE4L (ref. 4) for lightning
induced transient studies. They are representative of the form of voltages and
curre~ts that may be present in cables in a lightning-produced electromagnetic
environment. The waveshapes are intended for direct injection on system pins
and l~nes and levels of the waveshapes are restricted to nondestructive levels.
When ana~og transients are injected on digital system lines or p~ns they
reach -the interfacing circuitry in the system devices. A prediction of the
behavior of the interfacing circuitry when driven with the analog transient was
performed by analyzing the circuitry at the component level using the SCEPTRE
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(System for Circuit Evaluation of Transient Radiation Effects) program.
Circuit topology is converted to an equivalent SCEPTRE circuit description to
be used as input data for the SCEPTRE program. Transistors and diodes are
modeled using the basic elements necessary for the SCEPTRE equivaleqt circuits,
including resistors, capacitors, inductors, current, and voltage soyrces.
Values for the Ebers-Moll transistor model and the diode model were obtained
from manufacturers' data and from information of typical fabrication processes
for monolithic integrated circuits. A family of component-level logic models
for use in SCEPTRE analysis including gates, flip-flops, and tri-state devices,
has been developed for this study for TTL and CMOS technology.
A typical transient injection circuit used to generate transients coupled
to digital devices and shown in figure 3 was designed, breadboarded, and tested
to compare its operation with SCEPTRE analysis of the such a circuitry. The
tank circuit is connected to the injection point through a parallel RC circuit
for isolation. Since the injection point of the circuit under test has a
nonlinear input impedance, the waveshape at the injection point is clipped,
non~inusoidal, and thus unlike the sinusoidal tank output. The SCEPTRE code
accurately models this circuit as shown in figures 4 and 5. To achieve the
nonclipped, SAE recommended waveshape at the injection point, an idealized
injection circuit was defined for use with SCEPTRE in the upset susceptibility
study. The idealized circuit is accomplished in the SCEPTRE code via a
mathematical function and has a low impedance source, perfect switc~es, and
very high frequency response.
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Figures 6 and 7 are examples of the response of a D-type flip-flop used in
a latch circuit to the modeled injection circuit and the idealized transient
signal. The transient was injected on the data input line while the flip-flop
was disabled and in a high state. In the first example, using the oscillating
tank injection circuit, the flip-flop state was changed from a high to low
state. In the second example, using the ideal injection source, the flip-flop
does not experience a state change. Thus, the injected signal harmonic content
as well as the coupling circuit have an impact on the circuit analysis results.
SYSTEM SIMULATION
An 8080 microprocessor-based computer system was simulated in the
functional level simulation study. This system was chosen to provide
comparison with a similar hardware-based study (ref. 5). Functional level
simulation was accomplished with the General Simulation Program (GSP) (ref. 6)
running on a CDC Cyber 170-730 computer. This program has the capability for
16 functional models such as counters, microprocessors, latches, etc. The
modeling is performed with a microcode instruction set. Variable propagatLon
delay and internal registers can be implemented in the simulation. An example
of a flip-flop model described with the microcode is listed in table 1.
Figure 8 shows the system block diagram used in the upset susceptibility
study. An extra module was designed and added to the model system ~o access
the system lines for injection purposes. The injection module is inserted in
the line on which injection is intended. Under normal operation, the system
signal propagates through the injection module unaltered with no time delay.
Ther~fore, this module, when disabled, is completely transparent to the
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remaining modules. When the injection module is enabled, the affected line
signal is controlled by the user running the simulation. The digital
equivalent signal, derived from the SCEPTRE circuit analysis using the
idealized transient signal, was used to control the affected line. State
changes of latches at ei ther end of the affected line are used to i.ntroduce
logic errors into the digital signals transmitted over the line acqording to
the results of the circuit analysis.
The program executed during injection studies is in table 2. The program
loads a byte from memory into the accumulator, stores the accumulator into
memory and jumps to the first instruction at memory location (1000).16 in a
continuous loop. This program exercises three of a possible ten machine cycles
(table 3) and is intended to provide a correlation of the machine cycles with
the upset conditions. The first set of hardware tests were performed and
reported in reference 5 using this program.
The program is loaded in RAM starting at memory location (1000)16. When
the simulation starts, the microprocessor is initialized equivalent to a power
on reset. It loads and executes a jump instruction in ROM location (0000)16
and after 6500 nanoseconds the microprocessor starts executing the program in
RAM address (1000)16.
The time of the transient injection into the system was deter~ined by
selecting a random number between 0 and 15000 and adding it to 650Q. The time
required by the microprocessor to execute the program in RAM once is 15000
nanoseconds. Therefore, the injection can occur with equal probability at any
point in the program. The random numbers were obtained from a table of random
numbers (ref. 7) and normalized to meet the boundary requirement.
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TEST RESULTS
During initial upset test runs, operation codes (op-codes) that are
undefined in the microprocessor instruction set were loaded in the instruction
register as a result of the injected transients. The simulation microprocessor
model treated these undefined op-codes as "no operation" instructions. A
program that makes use of the undefined op-codes was written and exec~ted in
hardware to determine the response of the microprocessor to such codes and
modifications were made to the microprocessor model accordingly. Of the 12
undefined codes 7 acted as one byte instruction and execution continued with
the next immediate byte and 5 acted as control instructions with the next two
bytes as part of the instruction. No attempt was made to reproduce with the
microprocessor model the control output signals generated when the hardware
microprocessor is executing the undefined opcodes.
Sixty-six transient injections were performed during program execution.
Each transient injection was performed on a single line at a time and in all 66'
cases the injected signal was the digital equivalent of a 1 MHz damped
sinusoid. The points of the injections in the system were MDl
o
' MDl 3, and MDl 7
of the input data bUS, DB of the output data bUS, D of the bidirectional data
o 0
bus, and MAD
o
of the memory address bus.
During execution, the microprocessor bidirectional data bUS, high and low
address bUS, system output data bUS, and Chip selection control lines were
monitored, as well as the pins and internal registers of the microprocessor
model. Locations in memory that were not use'd for the program were loaded with
zero (00)16 in the simulation as opposed to the hardware test (ref. 5) Where
unused memory locations had random content. Therefore, when program control
was transferred to a memory location out of the defined program, the no
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operation instruction NOP (00)16 was loaded and no undefined status word was
observed during any of the transient injection runs. Forty-one system
anomalies were registered including 24 errors and 17 upsets. System anomalies,
errors and upsets for each injection line are summarized in table 4., In the
error case, the microprocessor stored or loaded erroneous data, stored data in
a nonspecified location or skipped an instruction but went back to the normal
:'
program loop. In the upset case, the microprocessor went out of the program
loop to empty or nonexistent memory locations. Simulation test results on
system errors and upsets as a function of injection lines were comparable with
hardware results with the exception of the memory address line (MAD), where no
errors or upsets were registered in 346 injections in the hardware test and
seven errors and four upsets were recorded in11 injections in the aimulation
test. Further tests are presently being performe"d to resolve the d1"fference
between hardware and simulation upsets caused by injections on the MAD line.
, . 0
Of 17 upsets, 13 were caused when the injection was performed during the jump
instruction. These results point to an apparent higher susceptibility to upset
of the program control instruction. Table 5 shows the classificatio,n of upsets
and errors when the injections were performed during load (MVIA), store (STA)
and jump (JMP).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The simplicity of the program executed during transient runs p~rmitted
observation of the patterns that lead to the upset condition. The ~pset
susceptibility is highly dependent on program structure (ref. 3). When 1-bit
of a,3-byte instruction is changed, the instruction could become a 1-byte
instruction, and the two next immediate data bytes are then loaded qS
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instructions. This condition was observed 12 times during the 66 upset test
runs and three of those cases led to upset. In total, 29 data bytes were read
as instructions and the effect on the program flow depended on the data value,
its location in the program,' and the instruction immediately after the data
byte or bytes.
Although none of. the test runs caused the original program in RAM to be
partially or totally overwritten, the potential for overwriting programs was
identified in the error cases when the microprocessor stored data in memory
locations different from those specified.
Results of the study can be used to obtain the parameters necessary for a
stochastic model, similar to the stochastic model in reference 5, to compute
susceptibility of the system. The methodology described provides the
capability of performing upset tests and establishing an upset susceptibility
level for a system using models developed during design stages.
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TABLE 1 - FLIP-FLOP MODEL WITH GSP MICROCODE
; MODEL J K
;
;DECLARATION OF INTERNAL REGISTERS
;NO INTERNAL REGISTERS ARE NEEDED IN J K MODEL
REG( 1) DUMMY
;
;DECLARATION OF ALL EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS
;PIN EX(150) FOR SIMULATION CONTROL PURPOSES
;
PIN J( 1) ,K(2) ,Q(3) ,QBAR(4) ,CLK(5) ,EX(150)
;
;PROPAGATION DELAY SPECIFICATION
EVW OUT( 15)
BEQ CLK,LATCH
BEQ J,K,INT
M)V(OUT) J,Q
MOV(OUT) K,QBAR
MOV ItO, EX
INT: BEQ J ,LATCH
COM (OUT) Q
COM (OUT) QBAR
LATCH: MOV ItO, EX
END
IF CLK EQUAL ZERO JUMP TO LATCH
IF J EQUAL K JUMP TO INT
GIVE Q THE VALUE OF J AFTER A 15
NANO SECOND DELAY
GIVE QBAR THE VALUE OF K AFTER A 15
NANO SECOND DELAY
TERMINATE THE EXECUTION OF
THIS MODULE
;COMPLEMENT THE VALUE OF Q
;INSTRUCTION IS EXECUTED WHEN J=K
;COMPLEMENT THE VALUE OF QBAR. THIS
;INSTRUCTION IS EXECUTED WHEN J=K
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TABLE 2 - PROGRAM CODE EXECUTED DURING INJECTION STUDIES
CLOCK ADDRESS INSTRUCTION MNEMONIC
CYCLES
7 10 00 3E MVIA
01 CB
13 02 32 STA
03 19
04 10
10 05 C3 JMP
06 00
07 10
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TABLE 3 - 8080 MACHINE CYCLES AND CORRESPONDING 8-BIT
STATUS SIGNALS IN HEXADECIMAL FORMAT
MACHINE CYCLE
INSTRUCTION FETCH
MEMORY READ
t~Er.10RY WRITE
STACK READ
STACK WRITE
INPUT
OUTPUT
INTERRUPT
HALT
INTERRUPT WHILE HALT
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STATUS SIGNAL
A2
82
00
86
04
42
10
23
8A
2B
TABLE 4 - SYSTEM ANOMALIES AT EACH INPUT POINT ON THE
SIMULATED SYSTEM UNDER TEST
INPUT SYSTEM
POINTS INJECTIONS ANOMALIES ERRORS UPSETS
MDl o 11 (11) 6 (11) 2 (3) 4 (8)
MDI 3 11 (11) 4 (11) 2 (0) 2 (11)
MDI] 11 (11) 10 (11) ] (1) 3 (10).
Do 11 (2) 11 (2) 6 (1) 5 (1)
~1ADo 11 (346) 11 (0) ] (0) 4 (0)
DBo 11 (720) 1 (0) 1 (0) o (0)
---
66 43 25 18
( ) Hardware test results.
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TABLE 5 - UPSETS AND ERRORS FOR TRANSIENT INJECTIONS
DURING INSTRUCTION CYCLE
MVIA STA JMP TOTAL
NO UPSET 11 10 4 25
ERRORS 14 10 0 24
UPSET 1 3 13 17
TOTAL 26 23 17 66
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Fig. 4 - Transient input signal on the flip-flop 0 line of a
hardware setup using a tank injection circuit.
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